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Making the Cut: Exploring Application Evaluation and
Programme Accessibility in Embassy-based Small Grant Schemes
Nikolai George Lewis Holm
Faculty for Social Science, Nord University, Bodø, Norway
Abstract Embassy-based mall grant schemes provide opportunities for local
actors to achieve development and human security functionings that are locally
valued but may otherwise go unaddressed; however, accessing these funds is
highly competitive, with only a fraction of applicant claims being successful and
resulting in funding. This qualitative study explores the factors behind successful
grant-seeking from the perspectives of grant scheme managers and evaluators. It
explores how accessing small grant schemes is mediated by a system of practices
and preferences at both the personal and programme level. The study highlights
how some processes and patterns inherent in small grant schemes can result in
capital-rich actors being more successful, counter-normative to the inclusive
aims of such grant programmes; however, interviews also highlight an awareness
of these barriers by grant programme staff, and indicate a number of practices to
enable greater accessibility. Interviewees report that local actors who are able to
construct effective narratives can compensate for disparities in other social and cul-
tural capital.
Keywords: capability approach; grant aid; human security; field theory;
securitization
Introduction
The development potential of small grant schemes (SGS) lies in their ability to cat-
alyse development and improve human security by creating opportunities for bottom-
up, recipient driven development via small financial grants. SGSs are a niche tool
that evades the criticisms of top-down or merely participatory approaches – the
former for creating a disconnect between programme objectives and beneficiaries
needs, and the latter for potentially minimizing local involvement to a tokenistic
component (Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2017; Cleaver, 1999; Cooke and Kothari,
2001; David and Tenkon, 2015). By contrast, SGSs can ensure local actors not
only participate in development, but design and direct projects themselves. They
target the sort of bottom-up actors who may have the motivation and skills to
address human security or development issues in their communities, but simply
lack the funding to achieve their goals (Cleaver, 1996; 1999). Connecting local
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actors with the financial capital enables them to achieve locally valued development
goals. The question, however, is how accessible and inclusive are such schemes?
This article examines these issues of grant access and gatekeeping via experiences
and perspectives of individuals who manage SGSs based at donor country embassies
and high commissions.
While SGSs are an idealistic alternative to top-down development strategies, they
are still eyed with scepticism by some funders and are not without drawbacks (See:
Lentfer, 2015; Sriskandarajah, 2015). Directly funding local actors is risky, thus
donors ensure SGSs are highly selective, rife with prophylactic evaluation processes,
all resulting in a very competitive (and potentially exclusionary) process. Numerous
barriers make accessing funding via an SGS a difficult or even impossible for those
capital-poor actors who may be most in need of support (Holm, 2018). The main
advantage of SGSs is the capacity to empower smaller, capital-poor actors;
however, practices of such funds are crafted to ensure accountability, often at the
expense of accessibility. Herein lies the challenge for fund managers and
administrators.
This article explores how the practices and processes inherent in embassy-based
small grant schemes affect accessibility and SGS participation by smaller develop-
ment actors. Interviews with SGS administrators and staff reveal that systems of pre-
ferences, practices, and processes influence which local actors and projects make the
cut, overcome barriers and gatekeeping, and receive funding. Using a conceptual fra-
mework based on the capability approach, human security (HS), securitization, and
field theory, this article explores the accessibility in grant schemes from perspective
of those managing or administering small grant schemes themselves. It does not
evaluate of SGSs in terms of achieving specific development goals, but provides a
critical examination the role of SGSs in expanding the capabilities of local actors
to engage in development activities and work towards self-defined development
and human security goals.
Conceptual framework
This research employs a conceptual framework that draws on several theoretical and
conceptual components to understand how SGSs function to facilitate the expansion
of development and human security capabilities. Firstly, the capability approach pro-
vides a normative evaluative framework for reflecting on issues of agency and local
needs. Secondly, human security provides an inclusive and actor-relevant paradigm
for understanding critical development needs and insecurities. Thirdly, bottom-up
securitization is employed as an analytical heuristic for understanding how needs are
communicated and claims interpreted. Finally, Bourdieu’s ‘thinking tools’ of field,
capital, and habitus help situate and describe inter-actor relations and the relative
capacity of actors to achieve their goals. This section introduces these components
and their function in the analytical framework.
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Human security as a capability
The concept of human security, largely born out of the 1994 UNDP Human Develop-
ment Report, shifts the focus of security from states to individuals and communities
(UNDP, 1994). HS’s core is the idea that underdevelopment and security are linked,
and insecurity at the highest levels is not separate from insecurities perceived and
experienced by individuals. Issues as broad as good governance and access to health-
care become as fundamental to security as interstate conflict. However, as Liotta (2002,
pp. 474–475) notes, whenever we engage with issues of security we must also ask:
Security from what, security by whom, and security achieved through which means?
These value-laden questions, requiring an understanding of what insecurities exist
from the perspective of those who are themselves insecure. Understanding the role
of values and preferences in the pursuit of human security can be aided by reflecting
on Amartya Sen’s capability approach.
The capability approach is a normative evaluative framework that prioritizes the
ability of individuals to achieve the things they value by expanding freedoms and
opportunities. The fundamental units of this approach are functionings and capabilities
(Sen, 1999). Functionings are the kinds of beings or doings that an individual may
value. Capabilities are the freedoms and capacities that enable individuals to achieve
various functionings. The classic example for distinguishing these terms is that of a
starving child and a fasting monk. Eating, fasting, and starving are all functionings,
however, fasting is fundamentally different from starving because it is a choice. The
monk exists in a position of greater security as he retains the capability of eating. Indi-
viduals’ security needs are varied and depend on their context, thus, approaches to
achieving HS must reflect peoples’ real needs and values regarding functionings.
Not all functionings are equally valued or achievable by everyone. There have been
attempts to codify universal capabilities lists to supplement to Sen’s framework (Alkire
and Black, 1997; Clark, 2002; Nussbaum, 2000; 2003; Robeyns, 2003). However, Sen
(2004, p. 78) has been sceptical of predefined lists, arguing that they inhibit partici-
pation. An inclusive perspective on which capabilities are relevant to a context
ensures a space for individual values. The opposite results in proposed paths to devel-
opment and security that may be undesirable to those in need. For example, regarding
economic security, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) point to a danger for funders to
favour approaches too focused on singular economic sectors, such as agriculture, thus
failing to address the multi-dimensional aspects of poverty. Similarly, Bebbington
(2005, p. 946) cautions that some aid schemes target only a segment of the population,
such as the middle-poor, leaving the most chronically insecure behind. Bendaña (2006,
p. 12) notes how these problems emerge when funders and experts decide both the diag-
nosis and the remedy for development problems. Thus, the capability approach insists
that people be empowered to pursue functionings that are relevant to their lives and
values. It is here that SGSs have the most potential, being recipient driven, allowing
actors to answer the questions of security fromwhat, bywhom, and throughwhatmeans.
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The relationship between capabilities and HS is exemplified by the Commission on
Human Security’s (2003, p. 4), which stated that ‘[h]uman security must also aim at
developing the capabilities of individuals and communities to make informed
choices and to act on behalf of causes and interests in many spheres of life.’ The expan-
sion of freedom and choice – from both an HS and capabilities perspective – should
extend to the pursuit of human security goals. As such, SGSs can be tools of empow-
erment, enabling the expansion of human security capabilities by helping actors to
achieve their desired security functionings; however, to do so they must be open and
accessible to those capital-poor actors who may be the most insecure.
SGSs provide local actors access to external support for achieving their security and
development goals using self-determined strategies. This contrasts with some practices
of other international development organizations, who may merely acknowledge local
voices while maintaining a largely top-down approach to planning and focus (Bendaña,
2006).As an applicant driven tool SGSs lend themselves to the normative goals of the capa-
bility approach in that theyprovide apath to security anddevelopment centredon the expan-
sion of choice and local agency (See: Clark, 2005; Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 1999; 2005).
However, SGSs are also constrained by limited resources, both in terms of bureaucratic
needs and financial resources. Competition is fierce. Applicants need to assemble compel-
ling claims about local needs in order to succeed. To understand the nature of such claims,
this research heuristically utilizes a bottom-up variant of securitization theory.
Bottom-up securitization and analysing local claims
Bottom-up securitization is a relatively recent adaptation of the theory; however, the
traditional concept from the Copenhagen School (CS) has been broadly applied in inter-
national relations and security research (See: Balzacq, 2005; 2010; Buzan et al., 1998;
Hammerstad, 2012; Salter, 2008; Stritzel, 2007). Securitization is the process by which
security is constructed through speech acts (Buzan et al., 1998). The securitization
process unfolds thusly: A securitizing actor voices a claim that the referent object is
a threat or is threatened and therefore requires special handling not normally available
to the securitizing actor. The audience exposed to the securitizing act interprets and
considers the credibility of the claim, and if they deem it reasonable, a kind of response
or special handling is legitimized.
Normally, securitizing actors make their claims from a position of political or insti-
tutional power, leveraging their social and cultural capital behind the securitizing act.
Bottom-up securitization, by contrast, is when actors with less conventional forms of
power – like grassroots or community actors – are able to use speech acts to leverage
their own security values onto a broader or more powerful audience (for examples, see:
Adamides, 2012; Hammerstad, 2012; Holm, 2017). Through successful bottom-up secur-
itization, smaller actors can access tools or motivate action that would not have otherwise
occurred. In terms of units for analysis, both classical and bottom-up processes are similar;
however, the factors that contribute to success of a securitizing act are very different.
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Contextual factors determine which security claims are expressed and how success-
ful they are with the audience. Bottom-up actors might try to capitalize on shared under-
standings of security, or construct a compelling claim around the value of a response.
However, social groups may be silenced in certain contexts, and therefore unable to
give voice a security claim (Hansen, 2000). Moreover, making a claim alone is not suf-
ficient for success. Effective securitization is audience-centred, context-dependent, and
power-laden (Balzacq, 2005, p. 171). The success of a securitizing act depends on the
nature of the audience, the claim, the contextual particularities, and the power dynamics
between the actor and the audience. The role of the audience in security-making is criti-
cal according to Côté (2016), who points to emerging recognition of the co-construction
of security between actors and audiences. Effective bottom-up acts occur where actors
and audiences share similar notions of security and who constitutes a legitimate security
actor. Adamides (2012) suggests that bottom-up securitization is more likely where
insecurities have become ‘institutionalised,’ embedded in the social and political
field. For example, successful claims about human insecurities are more likely to res-
onate with audiences holding HS inclusive notions of security.
Securitization functions largely as a heuristic tool in this article. SGSs applicants are
a kind of securitizing actor – they use speech acts to compel an audience to respond to a
locally valued functioning through a form of special handling. Not all applicants to
SGSs will utilize securitizing narratives; however, one expects successful applicants’
claims to be interpreted as more credible or critical in relation to others. Bottom-up
securitization helps to conceptualize the interaction between claim-making actors and
grant-giving audiences, in addition to being a potential factor in success itself.
SGSs are a potential space for local actors to address their needs, serving as a
pathway for actors to make claims that result in special handling. Not all claims will
be deemed credible and legitimate by audiences – there are rules, power dynamics,
and contextual factors that constrain success. The relative success of the securitizing
act can be understood along a spectrum, where utter failure is represented by an
inability to access audiences, and success by the achievement of special handling
(Figure 1). This spectrum helps reflect on the capacity of SGS applicants as securitizing
actors by considering the challenges they face in accessing audiences, communicating
their human security needs, and influencing the audience. How far any applicant
Figure 1: Evaluating relative success\failure of bottom-up securitization
Source: Salter (2008).
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proceeds on this spectrum depends on the capital available to the actor, and the nature
of the social space where claims are made. The next section illustrates how Bourdieu’s
‘thinking tools’ of field, capital, and habitus help to understand these factors.
Bourdieu’s thinking tools – field, capital, and habitus
TheworkofPierreBourdieuhasbeen increasingly applied in international relations, particu-
larly within security studies (for example: Adler-Nissen, 2013; Balzacq, 2005; Bigo, 2008;
2011; Bigo and Martin-Mazé, 2014; Villumsen Berling, 2011; Vuori, 2008). Bourdieu’s
‘thinking tools’ of field, capital, and habitus help in framing and analysing complex
actor-audience relations in a conceptuallymanageableway, allowingamore coherent analy-
sis of complex actor relations (Wacquant, 1989).This section introduces how these concepts
relate to the contextual and relational factors that contribute to applicant success or failure.
Field is the social space where relations occur. It is where agents – actors and audi-
ences – are located and compete over access to capital and influence. Fields are not
anarchic spaces, but governed by rules inherent to the context, as well as each
agent’s habitus, dispositions, and capital (Bourdieu, 1984). Nor are fields singular,
but often hierarchical and overlapping. In this study, the primary field of interest con-
tains the audience (SGS funders) and numerous competing securitizing actors (appli-
cants); however, other actors (such as governments) exist in related fields and can
influence how audiences respond to claims.
The position of agents in the field is determined by their capital (Bourdieu and Wac-
quant, 1992). That is, the resources available to any agent that are relevant to the particu-
lar field, taking social, cultural, and economic forms (Bourdieu, 1984; 1986). Social
capital is the resources that an agent derives from interpersonal networks and relation-
ships, such as contacts or reputation that demonstrate your legitimacy as an actor. Cultural
capital (subdivided here into embodied and institutionalized capital) is a person’s knowl-
edge, education, and intellectual skills. Agents acquire embodied capital through sociali-
zation, culture, or traditions. Institutionalized capital is often credentials, qualifications, or
other formalized representations. An example of cultural capital would be familiarity with
grant-writing techniques, demonstrable skills for implementation of projects, or NGO
credentials. Economic capital is the material resources and assets that an actor possesses.
Small grant schemes are then the field in which local actors convert social and cultural
capital into economic capital through bottom-up securitizing acts.
Success in securitization depends on both actor and audience capital, values, and
rules inherent in the field where securitization is occurring. Bigo and Martin-Maze
(2014, p. 4) write,
[t]he ability of any referent object to be threatened depends… on the societal values that
give some kind of importance and meaning to the object under threat. What is deemed
insignificant cannot be threatened, for no one cares for it.
For a claim to succeed, it must resonate with the values of the audience, and be backed
by capital appropriate to the field. Additionally, success depends on the rules and
332 Nikolai George Lewis Holm
practices that exist in the field of SGS – best understood with the concepts of habitus
and dispositions.
Dispositions are the ‘ingrained and mostly inarticulate proclivities and tendencies
accumulated through personal exposure and collective history’ whereas habitus
refers to an agent’s system dispositions and the patterns of action that emerge from
(Pouliot, 2013, p. 47). They are factors that influence audiences’ potential inclinations,
for example, favouring particular kinds of projects, actors, or forms of capital (for
example, accreditation, social connections, or demonstrated experience). The position
of actors in the field, their capital, and dispositions or habitus influence the way in
which interactions play out, reproducing patterns of practice. These concepts are
useful in analysing the SGS field, as they help to understand whether grants giving
practices expand capabilities or simply replicate processes that favour the same kinds
of actor capital and claims.
Social fields and their practices are difficult to describe succinctly, even with a rela-
tively contained field as small grant schemes. As such, this study draws on a previous
exploration of SGSs (see: Holm, 2018), which through extensive document analysis
identified a number of potential barriers to access that applicants must overcome.
That study constructed a typology of barriers inherent in SGSs in terms of the kind
of capital needed to overcome them (Table 1). This includes economic capital barriers,
such as the need to have existing resources before applying; social barriers, such as the
need for existing relationships with funders; cultural barriers, such as the need for NGO
accreditation; and other barriers, such as funder preferences and dispositions, or barriers
emerging from potential risks of partnership with foreign actors.
Using this typology of barriers as a starting-off point, this article seeks to
challenge or confirm their relevance to SGS success, but also to explore their influence
from the perspective of the audiences. The next section explains the methods used in
this study.
Methods
This article uses qualitative approaches informed by the results of the two previous
studies by the author on local actors and embassy-based SGSs. The first study, Holm
(2017) provided a detailed comparative case study of local development actors who
worked to secure grant funding for local projects, detailing the challenges and strategies
they face in doing so. The second study by Holm (2018) presents an inversion of the
2017 case study, examining not the SGS applicants, but instead the formal pro-
gramme-level frameworks, and constructs a typology of barriers inherent in SGSs
that applicants must overcome. These studies, in combination, inform the data analysis
and interview questions in this article.
Qualitative methods were chosen due to the limited pool of potential participants,
and to enable more detailed analysis regarding themes and informant perspectives
(Stake, 1995). This detail-oriented approach is essential when investigating complex
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and contextual subjects, such as interviewee perspectives and experiences interpreting
grant applications.
The study occurred in three phases: planning, collection, and synthesis. The plan-
ning phase began the construction of a theoretical and analytical framework, the exam-
ination of background articles or reports, and the identification of potential cases used
for recruitment. A number of criteria informed case selection. Firstly, the grant












Barriers that relate to the
accessible financial and
material assets the applicant,
or that occur in the form of
restrictions placed on the use
of grant funding. (e.g. access
to internet, independent
funds, etc.)
Social capital . Previous relationships
. Existing partnerships
. Word-of-mouth calls
. Sources of legitimacy
Barriers that relate to the social
networks and relationships
that influence the applicants’























and be recognized as a
legitimate actor in the field.
(e.g. strong English skills,
NGO registration, familiarity






. Funder preferences or
need for risk aversion
. Mismatch of values
regarding claims and
solutions
Barriers that relate to how
preferences and dispositions
of actors in the field could
impact the acceptance or
rejection of specific
applications.






Barriers or risks that do not
clearly fit into any category,
such as risks that can be
incurred from programme
participation.
Table 1: Capital barriers to access in small grant schemes.
Source: Holm (2018).
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programmes should focus on local actors or local development issues. Secondly, the
grant system should be primarily applicant driven, relying on local project submissions
as opposed to top-down projects. Thirdly, the grant programmes should be sufficiently
broad in theme for interpretation through an HS lens. A number of embassy-based
schemes were identified within these parameters (Table 2), including the Canada
Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI); Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security
Projects (GGP); Norwegian Embassy Grants (NEG); Fund for Local Cooperation
(FLC); and United Kingdom Small Grants (UKG).1
The collection phase, from June 2017 to June 2018, involved the recruitment and
interviewing of participants. Recruitment began by generating a list of embassies and
high commissions in developing countries. These were contacted with a letter of
enquiry regarding the status of any SGSs at their mission and a request for the contact
information of SGS staff. Those that responded to the contact request were invited to par-
ticipate in interviews. As was indicated in previous studies on elite interviewing and
research involving diplomatic services, access and recruitmentwas a difficult and partici-
pation rates were low (see: Goldstein, 2002; Neumann, 2012; Pouliot, 2013). From hun-
dreds of requests, only 30 individuals agreed to participate in the interview process.
As face-to-face interviewing on a global scale is prohibitively expensive, partici-
pants invited to interview over the phone, by Skype, or through an email interview
process. Interviews were audio recorded, except in two cases where handwritten
notes were taken. Most participants opted for Skype or telephone interviews,
however, email interviews preferred by some as it allowed them the opportunity to care-
fully consider their responses and reply in their own time – this was consistent with
Bowden and Galindo-Gonzales (2015) analysis of email interviewing methods. Inter-
views focused on patterns of practice, project selection, applicant credibility, and bal-
ancing local vs funder needs amongst others. Additional questions focused on personal
reflections on SGSs and possibilities for programme improvement. Recorded inter-
views were transcribed and anonymized. Geographic indicators were removed, along
with information that could indicate special circumstances unique to a particular diplo-
matic post. This level of anonymity was key in assuring participants that they could
speak freely. Interestingly, after interviews, many participants described the process
as cathartic, perhaps because the interview processes allowed them to express frustra-
tions or dissatisfactions with SGS processes or constraints. Indeed, many interviewees
indicated varying degrees of satisfaction with how their particular SGSs operated in
general, or within their particular context.
The synthesis phase of the project consisted of processing the interview data using the-
matic analysis. Transcribed data was uploaded into qualitative data analysis software
1 Unlike Canadian, Japanese, and Finnish SGSs, Norwegian and United Kingdom small grant
approaches do not appear to have an standardized official or an umbrella name used across all
embassies or high commissions, thus the acronyms used here are strictly for the purposes of
this article.
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NVivo and coded using predetermined and emergent themes. Predetermined themes
included patterns of practices, rejection\approval factors, forms of capital, and others relat-
ing to barriers (as in Table 2) or securitization. Emergent themes focused on exceptions to
expected behaviour or practice. Finally, the information was synthesized into this article.
Data presentation
As mentioned, this analysis applies a spectrum of success\failure of bottom-up secur-
itization to understand the challenges faced by SGS applicants in successful grant
seeking. For the purposes of this article, this spectrum is simplified into three key sec-
tions: access to audiences, legitimacy as securitizing actors, and a compelling security
claim or narrative. This section presents and discusses the interviewee perspectives on
local actor capacities to progress along the spectrum, from initial access to audiences, to
the granting of special handling. It does so by firstly, looking at the barriers to audience
access and communicating needs. Secondly, it presents barriers related to perceived
actor legitimacy and credibility as securitizing actors. Finally, it explores barriers
that inhibit audiences from accepting local actor claims and providing grants or
special handling.
Audience access and communication
The first hurdles in bottom-up securitization and receiving a SGS grant relate to acces-
sing audiences and communicating one’s security or development goals. Throughout
the interview process, participants reflected on these issues in a number of ways, pri-
marily in regards to practices surrounding distribution of calls, soliciting proposals,
and the capacity to produce illocutionary speech acts.
When asked about procedures for identifying potential partners or soliciting propo-
sals, participants described a range of practices. Most participants pointed towards
some form of restricted distribution, intended to balance the number of applications
received and streamline processing. Interviewees from all SGS programmes described
Grant scheme Grant administration Primary funder
Canada Fund for Local Initiatives
(CFLI)
Canadian embassies and high
commissions
Government of Canada
Grant Assistance for Grassroots
Human Security Projects (GGP)
Japanese embassies Government of Japan
Norwegian Embassy Grants (NEG) Norwegian embassies Government of Norway




Fund for Local Cooperation (FLC) Finnish embassies Government of Finland




Table 2: Small grant schemes (SGSs).
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processes as occurring in primarily online formats, sometimes in combination with
limited distribution through social or interpersonal networks. One NEG participant
described their practices thusly:
… in principle, we should have open calls and I think that is also now in the making with
the launch of something called ‘[unintelligible] portal’ which is coming. Which is basi-
cally more like an interactive tool where organizations and seekers for grants apply
there directly online for grants and the ministry and the embassies will respond and
conduct the correspondence and everything on the whole process in a specific electronic
tool, or online basically.2
The interviewee indicated that the shift away from open calls was (in their opinion) a
decision made to control in influx of applications, as well as to shift the burden of grant
decision making from embassies to Oslo. A CFLI interview said, ‘ …we do a call for
proposal online and so, most of the people that we will reach are people that have access
to information technology. We also do presentations, especially in [remote areas].’3 A
similar, mixed approach was noted by a UKG interviewee, who recalled distributing
grant information, ‘… in the papers and in social media, and with the forms and
stuff that people need to fill.’4 Interestingly, participants recognized that online-only
systems potentially cut out certain actors, but felt that it was a necessary approach in
order to streamline administrative processes.
Other participants indicated a shift away from the open-call model. A UKG partici-
pant testified, ‘We don’t always open a call for bids. Last time a call for bids was open
was in [year]. Opening a bidding process allowed us to find contacts, projects that we
did not know about.’5 They described using open calls as a kind of network building,
where new local contacts could be discovered as thematic priorities shifted.
In a similar vein, several Norwegian NEG participants reported using word-of-
mouth and informal networking as part of their solicitation process. Two participants
relayed experiences where, despite not having a current funding round, they found
ways to be available to hear from local actors about their needs. One recalled being
in the process of introducing a new development portfolio, saying,
…we were approached by an organization that I didn’t know from before and they were
working on gender issues. So I thought, let’s invite them because we might be changing
our portfolio, might be changing our partners… let’s hear what they have to say.6
Another described their accessibility thusly:
2 Interview with NEG representative, 2018.
3 Interview with CFLI representative, 2017.
4 Interview with UKG representative, 2018.
5 Email Interview with UKG representative, 2018.
6 Interview with NEG representative, 2018.
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So the strategy that I’ve adopted… is that basically, I’ve been very clear with people
coming what we can and cannot fund. So even before they come for a meeting, not to
waste their time. We’re always interested in hearing about your projects and if you
want to come and tell me about it. Even if we can’t fund you, maybe there are other
things that we can do together…But I really appreciate it also having people just
come to the embassy and talk about their work. Having a listen about what they do
and sometimes we can even do things like share their story on a social media platform.
Which is nothing compared to funding, but it seems that a lot of people appreciate that
embassies are actually willing to listen to what they do.7
In these cases, informal or irregular communication was a way of hearing about poten-
tial partner needs and building networks for possible future projects; however, it relied
on the local actors to initiate unsolicited contact.
Interestingly, a diplomat participant stationed in a country with a politically difficult
regime went further, saying informal networks were the only way to safely operate a
small grant fund:
We try not to spread the word too much because it’s slightly sensitive. But it’s a two-way
thing. I think many [local actors] know that [our country]… they support different pro-
jects and they apply without having any contact with them in advance. That’s one way
of identifying relevant or not so relevant projects. And the other way is just by being a
diplomat. Going out to society, the local civil society. Getting to know people.8
Where doing open calls was possibly unsafe, the embassy relied on developing exten-
sive local networks and making oneself available to hear proposals from new or estab-
lished contacts. By contrast, participants from the Japanese GGP uniformly reported
relying on open call models, with none reporting any form of targeted solicitation,
informal communication, or opportunities for unsolicited meetings.
In situations where local actors were able to access audiences, there were still
several potential barriers for hopeful securitizing actors. These related most commonly
to issues of language and communication. Nearly all respondents reported English as
the dominant or only language for legal documents, forms, and information in distrib-
uted calls. One participant with funding responsibilities in several countries in charge of
several countries stated that despite working across three non-English countries, their
process was ‘[o]nly in English. Our embassy doesn’t have [local language] speaking
personnel, as long as we are located in [other country]… There is no way around
that.’9 This meant that an applicant must have at least some English to assemble a
basic application; however, others indicated they indicated that perfect English com-
munication skills was not essential. Many interviewees reported that many applicants
were successful at communicating despite weak English skills. A GGP administrator
7 Interview with NEG representative, 2018.
8 Interview with Anonymous Diplomat, 2018.
9 Interview with NEG representative, 2018.
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recounted that some actors were still very capable of demonstrating and communicating
local claims. They recalled how ‘one organization, they really did not speak English
very well, but still, they know the numbers and they really know what they were
talking about… they really try to be sincere…’10 In another interview, an NEG par-
ticipant noted that when language problems emerged, they
… reach out to our local colleagues. For example if we have an applicant that we’d like to
work with and there are problems with the application, we invite them for a meeting and a
sit down and help them with the application.11
Those SGS participants with local staff in their offices cited them as resource, both in
terms of language and understanding the local context.
One exception to these English dominant systems was an Australia’s DAP interviewee
who noted that they had the full range of documents and services available in the local
national language. As a result, they received no applications in English. Interestingly,
this led to another communication problem in that language norms and narratives could
result in applications with ‘[lots of] adjectives and long language’ suggesting that
‘doesn’t always assist an application… getting straight to the point… the statistics on vul-
nerability and why it’s such an important need to meet might grab my attention more.’12
This situation was somewhat remarkable, with most participants attesting to a lack of local
language documents for their missions. That being said, participants generally expressed
that weak language skills were more problematic in later stages of SGS participation (such
as during reporting or monitoring) and not necessarily a definitive barrier to access.
Perceived legitimacy of local actors
For actors capable of accessing audiences and communicating claims, the next chal-
lenge relates to legitimacy and credibility. SGS administrators need to determine
whether the organization making the claim or proposing a project is an appropriate,
legitimate, and credible actor in the given context. Interviews revealed a broad range
of responses across SGSs on these issues, highlighting how complex the field of
SGSs can be.
One of the most surprising results related to diverse patterns of practice regarding
which kinds of groups typically received funding. Small grant funds ideally target
small local actors in order to maximise impact and ownership; however, some of the
interview participants indicated that the aim of funding local groups was not always
achieved. While some respondents indicated a preference for local groups, other
SGS staff suggested it was common to support larger NGOs or actors from developed
countries who worked on local level projects.
10 Interview with GGP representative, 2018.
11 Interview with NEG representative, 2018.
12 Interview with DAP representative, 2018.
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CFLI respondents described the average applicant as ‘ … usually a small, locally
based civil society organization’ with another CFLI interviewee claiming local organ-
izations made up ‘… 95% of who receive the funds.’13 Another CFLI interviewee
stressed the importance of relationships between implementers and beneficiary commu-
nities, asking ‘…what is the relationship of the organization to the community? Do
they already know the people in the community? Have they worked with them
before? Or do they just want to come… like the saviours.’14 FLC and DAP respondents
echoed similar responses in that community legitimacy was important and not some-
thing often found with international NGOs.
Other interviewees noted that non-local NGOs or NGOs based outside of the target
country also received grants. Interviewees from Japan’s GGP and Norway’s NEG
suggested that the focus of the project was more important than the implementer. An
NEG participant shared that ‘… for one of the school reconstruction projects we’ve
done too, we did a selection process and that was a Norwegian NGO that won that
bidding. They are based in Oslo. They don’t have a local office here.’15 Similarly, a
GGP interviewee recalled funding non-local partners as well, sharing ‘ … I work on
the water project in partnership with an Italian NGO.’16 Ensuring indigeneity of the
implementer was not always a major consideration from respondents when compared
to project impact.
Ensuring credibility was a major concern for all respondents, playing a key role in
selection. One DAP respondent recalled a local hospital sending in an application, with
an Australian doctor as the contact person:
So basically, the application stood out. And it did help that he’s an Australian and we
know him, being an Australian for our various Australian events so you do then talk
about it, and you go and have a look. And he shows you around, what’s the current situ-
ation. So it does have an extra [part], that you know who is applying, but initially the
application just stood out.17
The need for the project, in this case, was evident; however, the credibility of the appli-
cant also played a role. Trust and reference checking was mentioned by numerous par-
ticipants. Additionally, several interviewees recalled sharing informal ‘blacklists’
between embassies of applicants who were regarded as a risk. A few participants
shared stories of negative experiences where scammers and fraudulent organizations
targeted their fund.
Some participants noted NGO credentials as a key indicator of a credible or quali-
fied candidate. GGP participants uniformly listed NGO registration as an essential
13 Interview with CFLI representative, 2017.
14 Interview with CFLI representative, 2018.
15 Interview with NEG representative, 2018.
16 Interview with GGP representative, 2018.
17 Interview with DAP representative, 2018.
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requirement. However, a CFLI interviewee also noted that sometimes even certain qua-
lified applicants may be considered risky or illegitimate, recounting
… on paper you can fund local governments. To be quite honest, because of the mistrust
that we have in general, not just the Canadian embassy, but in general public has towards
government here…we usually don’t fund government projects.18
Another participant recalled bending the formal requirements around registration or
status in a given context, saying
… it depends on the country where you are. How stringent are the laws for establishing a
collective. And you know, in [previous CFLI posting] it was a bit more flux work with
associations there that were loosely based collectives that we were able to do projects
with them.19
In this case, evaluations for credibility and legitimacy were done in context.
Interestingly, GGP and DAP participants reported that often final decisions on projects
were sometimes reserved until a site visit occurred and actors evaluated in person. Site
visits were described as being useful in determining the credibility of the project and
the implementer, with a DAP participant sharing, ‘if you go and dig deeper and you
get a chance to meet them, obviously face to face contact often tells you a lot.’20 A
GGP participant recalled a story where a site visit revealed a suspicious applicant:
… sometimes, they try to be kind of sneaky… they hired some people. You know, like
[unintelligible] people who can speak good English or something. And then, they
really try to [promote] everything. They [said], ‘hey, this school really needs help’ and
everything. But then when I ask them, ‘hey, do you know when they fund this
school?’ and they have no idea about it. And I ask them, ‘do you know how many students
does this school have?’ and then they still really didn’t know. So I feel like, okay, they
kind of became [a] liar, and I really didn’t appreciate it.21
In this case, after visiting the site they became intensely sceptical about the applicant
and their claims. Other participants similarly reported that personal impressions and
preferences played a role in selection. A DAP staffer said, ‘I do really like… the head-
masters at schools. I do have a soft spot for them’22 indicating that these types of appli-
cants are looked upon favourably. Similarly, a CFLI respondent attested to a personal
preference to take risks on smaller, lesser-known organizations, sharing that ‘as a risk
taker, we are willing to do it…we establish a track record and we also build civil
society by doing that. By giving the chance to a bigger number of organizations to
18 Interview with CFLI representative, 2018.
19 Interview with CFLI representative, 2017.
20 Interview with DAP representative, 2018.
21 Interview with GGP representative, 2018.
22 Interview with DAP representative, 2018.
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be active.’23 They felt that some actors deserved a chance to prove their credibility and
that the smallness of CFLI grants enabled them to take risks on less established actors.
These kinds of comments suggest that despite rule-based frameworks for evaluating
applications, personal preferences on the part of individual SGS staff do play a small
role in gatekeeping and successful grant seeking.
Audience acceptance of claims
Even in those cases where a local actor is capable of accessing audiences and is deemed
credible or legitimate, the success of a claim is not guaranteed. In the face of multiple
competing claims, successful actors must be exceptionally compelling and their claims
should resonate with the dispositions of their audiences. The mere act of making an
application is not enough to guarantee success: Audiences need to be convinced that
the applicant and the project will be impactful and worth the risk.
During the interview process, participants revealed that success applications depend
on an array of factors and a careful process of evaluation. For example, CFLI partici-
pants reported using a points-based system and multiple evaluators to make final
decisions. Others, like GGP participants, reported a process that relied heavily on the
staff making arguments to send particular projects up a chain of command in the
mission, then to the ministry in Tokyo. When asked about the experience of denying
an applicant, a GGP staffer relayed the following account:
Okay, so [for example], development application about… [a] shelter for widows and also
genocide survivors.… I thought this shelter program was very important, but it got
rejected by my boss. And then, it felt like, I don’t know. It’s difficult to prioritise. If
my boss’s priority is different from mine, and then, it can be an issue.24
Other GGP participants reported similarly that the preferences of persons up the hier-
archy strongly influenced which projects were accepted. This perspective was unique to
GGP interviewees.
Some aspects of selection were the same across all SGSs. For example, every par-
ticipant indicated they were required to select projects that fit a set of thematic priorities
that change from year to year. An FLC participant suggested that successful appli-
cations ‘… should be strongly related to the themes of the call and the priorities men-
tioned in the call.’25 A Norwegian NEG respondent stated,
we have governance, clean energy, and education as the three pillars, and then gender
equality is on the side. So if someone contacts and not within any of that, it is so unlikely
that we will be able to have any money to support that so I would say no.26
23 Interview with CFLI representative, 2017.
24 Interview with GGP representative, 2018.
25 Email Interview with FLC representative, 2018.
26 Interview with NEG representative, 2018.
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Participants generally reported that successful applicants demonstrated they clearly
understood the call for proposals and aligned their project accordingly.
Interestingly, some participants indicated that applications could be too finely
tuned. One DAP interviewee reflected on this, lamenting
And to be honest, I’ve read so many dodgy ones that it’s pretty easy to pick up on them. A
lot of the dodgy ones have really flowery text and big development sort of words, but we
don’t want those in DAP.27
They felt that too-perfect responses might indicate that the actor was too experienced to
represent the target group of DAP.
Questions about what poor applications or unconvincing claims look like yielded
interesting results. One commonality shared by many of the respondents was the
emphasis on need and the appropriateness of the response. A CFLI participant wrote
of unsuccessful applications as follows:
There are two common problems encountered when dealing small local organizations:
they don’t understand Canada’s perspectives and include parts to a project that support
their own points of view, but that would be considered harmful from a Canadian perspec-
tive; they are unsure about how they hope to achieve their goal.28
The ability of actors to show an understanding of donor country values and priorities
was uniformly reported as important. One GGP interviewee suggested that their own
selection process was guided by two other principles, saying ‘ …GGP focuses on
the basic human needs and human security concept.’29 The promotion of human secur-
ity has long been part of Japanese foreign policy. Another GGP staffer also suggested
promoting Japan’s brand was sometimes a factor, recalling of one grant receiver, ‘…
[recipients] really try to make sure that the Japanese sign becomes very visible, so I
really appreciate it.’30 Ensuring possibilities for self-promotion was common across
all SGSs.
Ensuring a geographic spread or reaching a more marginalized group was con-
sidered important. ‘Sometimes we might decide to look into locations of these projects
and select to fund may be the one in the remote area or disadvantaged group,’ said one
FLC interviewee.31 Similar sentiments were echoed by other participants, especially
those responsible for large or multiple countries or regions. The ability to demonstrate
project sustainability in terms of impact or continuation was universally touted as a
factor in grant success. A GGP interviewee questioned,
27 Interview with DAP representative, 2018.
28 Email Interview with CFLI representative, 2018.
29 Interview with GGP representative, 2018.
30 Interview with GGP representative, 2018.
31 Email Interview with FLC representative, 2018.
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how [are] they are going to sustain service delivery in the community where they have
proposed the project?… [s]how us a justification and… show also that the resources
that they have available internally or externally for project support.32
Multiple informants indicated the need to see a plan for continuation of services.
Some participants indicated preferences regarding solutions to insecurities. Most
participants viewed workshop proposals as ineffective, preferring either concrete or
innovative projects. Interestingly, this could incorporate very simple or complex
responses. A DAP interviewee gave an example of building a student hostel at a
remote school to provide safe accommodation and reduce risk of sexual violence.33
This was a simple solution to a clear and serious problem. A more complex example
was given by a CFLI staffer:
So one we did with the climate change, they were training women to use improved stoves
…within the context of the project, they sensitised the women about using improved
stoves… how using other stoves and not the improved one will bring out smoke, carci-
nogenic acids on the smoked fish, and when you eat it, you have health implications.
… Then after that, they will do a trial; help them to use a stove for the women to see
… So in the context of that, they will help some youth to learn how to build the stove,
so that at the end of the project, there will still be production going on in the community.34
This project represented a kind of ideal described by many respondents: innovative,
multi-level, cost effective, and highly visible. By contrast, GGP respondents
indicated a preference for simpler proposals – usually purchasing or construction agree-
ments – emphasizing the desire for concrete, achievable, high impact, and high visi-
bility projects. A nearly universal requirement was a kind of sustainability plan.
Every interviewee was asked about what differentiates how successful applicants
communicate and present their claims versus less-successful ones. Participants
pointed towards actors’ ability to assemble a kind of complete narrative package. An
NEG representative said,
… you look for some solidity in the application itself. Is there a coherence between goals,
purpose, indicators, you know the whole theory of change? If they present such [a] logical
framework… a clear connection between activities and goals.35
A CFLI staffer echoed
we wanted to look at whether the case made for the project, the justification made for the
need for this project… how convincing their arguments and logics are, and also trying to
see whether that fit with the priorities the CFLI has for this year.36
32 Interview with GGP representative, 2018.
33 Interview with DAP representative, 2018.
34 Interview with CFLI representative, 2018.
35 Interview with NEG representative, 2018.
36 Interview with CFLI representative, 2018.
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An FLC participant noted this was not necessarily connected to language or profession-
alism, but a kind of linguistic competence in connecting all the dots and assembling a
case:
… [t]he applications coming from [the other country] were very high quality, but in many
of those you could see that there was kind of a professional NGO application writer
writing [them]. But, what we realised, that that doesn’t really help many applications.
Some applications written with much worse level of English, much less understanding
of developmental vocabulary were much better focused and answering to real need of
certain groups of population for example. So, it is really this clear understanding of
your group of people’s problem, understanding why Finland wants to help with that,
and then having very focused program or activities which will help to solve or improve
the situation.37
This ability to communicate the seriousness of needs, appropriateness of solutions, and
value to funders was repeated by most participants. Interviewees treated imperfection or
lack of professionalism forgivingly, testifying to an understanding of capital disparity
between local actors and major NGOs. Some participants indicated that especially
promising applicants were sometimes given advice on how to improve proposals;
however, this kind of rejection of professionalism was not universal, even within the
same grant scheme. Another FLC interviewee recalled the following:
I can’t remember the details of the project, but it got the best score in the initial evaluation
and made a very strong impression on me – it was very professional. However, my
superior thought otherwise and wanted me to re-evaluate since she was impressed by
another application that had been presented to her in person by the applicant. I felt the
pressure to evaluate differently – so I did, after protesting without success.38
This highlights that there are always a number of factors at play and success or failure
for local actors can sometimes boil down to an issue of accessing the right person at the
right time.
Discussion and conclusions
Based on the range of responses from the interviewees, it is evident that accessing and
successfully receiving funds from a small grant scheme depends on a broad number of
factors. The typology of barriers developed in Holm (2018) appears highly relevant,
corresponding directly to a number of indicators in success\failure highlighted through-
out the interviews. That being said, the results of the one-on-one interview format
allowed SGS staff to indicate methods or practices they used to help local actors navi-
gate barriers, thus expanding capabilities to a certain degree.
The existence of economic capital barriers was evident. Participants’ indicated that
SGSs were increasingly switching to centralized or online-only application formats,
37 Interview with FLC representative, 2018.
38 Email Interview with FLC representative, 2018.
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suggesting that applicants will always require access to information technology – some-
thing that may be prohibitively expensive for many. Additionally, the focus on issues
such as project sustainability or continuing internal funding implies that actors with
little financial capital may be excluded from the opportunities gained by a one-time
grant. Other requirements, like spending restrictions, also indicate similar barriers.
Interestingly, some respondents noted that calls for proposals were still sometimes
communicated through conventional newspapers or interpersonal networks, suggests a
recognition of this economic-capital gap; however, this same word-of-mouth practice
highlights the importance of social capital for local actors. In a normative sense,
who-you-know should not dictate your capabilities. Without being appropriately con-
nected in the field, many smaller actors may miss out information regarding SGS oppor-
tunities. While controlled distributions are understandable administratively – SGSs
may otherwise be overwhelmed with applications – they do highlight a serious
social capital gap. On the positive note, several participants had indicated that they
made purposeful efforts to identify new potential partners and help build up the
social capital of smaller actors through their SGS activity. This is particularly impor-
tant, as interviewees uniformly reported reference checking with other embassies as
part of their selection process. It is commendable that some interviewees understand
their role in building social and cultural capital as well as financial.
On a related issue, interviews revealed some inconsistency of practice regarding
evaluating actors’ credibility and legitimacy. Results indicated that some SGS staff
evaluated claimants on a case-by-case basis, using a variety of indicators and prefer-
ences to make decisions. Capital in the form of reputation or credibility was cited as
highly important, but there was a great deal of flexibility in appraisal. The circulation
of informal blacklists was noteworthy, particularly as a kind of negative capital.
Additionally, the fact that non-local NGOs sometimes receiving funding in a competi-
tive process might suggest that cultural capital in the form of indigeneity of the actor is
not necessarily an asset or a requirement. SGSs could better improve local capabilities
by limiting themselves to local actors, despite the additional risks.
Responses regarding professional NGOs and non-professional grassroots groups
were diverse. Some indicated cultural capital barriers to the expansion of local capabili-
ties, as non-local actors may lack cultural capital in the form of professional develop-
ment training and grant writing skills. However, several respondents suggested that
they tried to focus less on professionalism and seeing the right buzzwords, and more
on the details of project aims and potential impacts. There was no evidence to show
that practices are deliberately exclusive to professional NGOs, in fact, several partici-
pants preferred to ensure partnerships with smaller, more grassroots actors. Anecdo-
tally, those participants who seemed to enjoy the SGS components of their work
more seemed to be more willing to tolerate less polished or professional applications.
In general, it appears that language skills were less important to success than the ability
of applicants to present a compelling narrative about local needs and solutions. This
emphasis on linguistic competence is very much akin to a securitizing act, where a
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threat and solution is laid out, making the case for special handling. Appropriateness
of responses and matching funder needs were clearly the top priority for all
interviewees.
Evidence from several interviews suggests that dispositional more than capital-
based barriers played a role for many participants in accepting local claims. Some dis-
positional factors were clear, such as funders thematic priorities listed in calls, but
others were made evident only through interviews. For example, disdain for
projects like workshops or seminars and preferences for ‘innovative’ projects. Inno-
vation is, almost by definition, novel and rare. Local actors may not always have an
innovative solution, and innovation may not be needed when a conventional solution
exists. Human security functionings may be readily achieved through conventional
projects.
GGP and FLC participants pointed towards the personal preferences of persons
involved in the selection process as being influential, sometimes negatively. CFLI
respondents were consistent in pointing towards a points-based committee system in
reducing the impact of personal dispositions – the downside being that system requires
more embassy staff to commit time to SGS duties. GGP and NEG participants indicated
more selection power being found in Tokyo and Oslo. The capacity for persons more
removed from the local context to exert influence over the selection process is trou-
bling, shifting more towards a top-down instead of a bottom-up scheme. Local
voices may not carry over long distances.
In general, the results confirm the relevance of the typology developed in Holm
(2018). Economic, social, and cultural capital all play a role in governing which
actors are able to access SGS funds. What was unexpected was the degree to
which participants from the same funder testified to different patterns of practice in
selection, particularly regarding the room for individual dispositions. Of course, dis-
positions are mediated by the overlapping fields interviewees exist in. One could
imagine a Venn diagram depicting the needs of the funder and those of the recipients
– the area in the middle being the legitimate actors and claims. Participants consist-
ently suggested the existence of flexibilities and context-specific practices, making it
difficult to pin down any consistent barriers to access across schemes or contexts. The
most important and consistent factor across all interviews was the need for local
actors to assemble a very concrete claim or narrative, one which very much parallels
Liotta’s (2002) security questions: from what, for whom, and by what means. Viewed
as bottom-up securitizing acts, security claims need to resonate with SGS audiences’
own security dispositions. Success or failure in accessing SGSs relies on the ability
for applicants to show themselves to be a legitimate actor with a very clear narrative
or claim.
Clearly, SGSs very much represent a way to expand human security capabilities,
although, they remain very competitive and the capital needs make them somewhat
exclusive as well. Thus, regarding accessing the opportunity small grant schemes rep-
resent, making the cut requires more than a willingness to step onto the field.
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